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Abstract
The advent of social media in recent years has
fed into some highly undesirable phenomena
such as proliferation of offensive language,
hate speech, sexist remarks, etc. on the Inter-
net. In light of this, there have been several
efforts to automate the detection and modera-
tion of such abusive content. However, delib-
erate obfuscation of words by users to evade
detection poses a serious challenge to the ef-
fectiveness of these efforts. The current state
of the art approaches to abusive language de-
tection, based on recurrent neural networks, do
not explicitly address this problem and resort
to a generic OOV (out of vocabulary) embed-
ding for unseen words. However, in using a
single embedding for all unseen words we lose
the ability to distinguish between obfuscated
and non-obfuscated or rare words. In this pa-
per, we address this problem by designing a
model that can compose embeddings for un-
seen words. We experimentally demonstrate
that our approach significantly advances the
current state of the art in abuse detection on
datasets from two different domains, namely
Twitter and Wikipedia talk page.
1 Introduction
Pew Research Center has recently uncovered sev-
eral disturbing trends in communications on the
Internet. As per their report (Duggan, 2014), 40%
of adult Internet users have personally experienced
harassment online, and 60% have witnessed the
use of offensive names and expletives. Expect-
edly, the majority (66%) of those who have per-
sonally faced harassment have had their most re-
cent incident occur on a social networking website
or app. While most of these websites and apps pro-
vide ways of flagging offensive and hateful con-
tent, only 8.8% of the victims have actually con-
sidered using such provisions.
Two conclusions can be drawn from these statis-
tics: (i) abuse (a term we use henceforth to collec-
tively refer to toxic language, hate speech, etc.) is
prevalent in social media, and (ii) passive and/or
manual techniques for curbing its propagation
(such as flagging) are neither effective nor easily
scalable (Pavlopoulos et al., 2017). Consequently,
the efforts to automate the detection and modera-
tion of such content have been gaining popularity
(Waseem and Hovy, 2016; Wulczyn et al., 2017).
In their work, Nobata et al. (2016) describe the
task of achieving effective automation as an inher-
ently difficult one due to several ingrained com-
plexities; a prominent one they highlight is the
deliberate structural obfuscation of words (for ex-
ample, fcukk, w0m3n, banislam, etc.) by users to
evade detection. Simple spelling correction tech-
niques and edit-distance procedures fail to provide
information about such obfuscations because: (i)
words may be excessively fudged (e.g., a55h0le,
n1gg3r) or concatenated (e.g., stupidbitch, femi-
nismishate), and (ii) they fail to take into account
the fact that some character sequences like musl
and wom are more frequent and more indicative of
abuse than others (Waseem and Hovy, 2016).
Nobata et al. (2016) go on to show that sim-
ple character n-gram features prove to be highly
promising for supervised classification approaches
to abuse detection due to their robustness to
spelling variations; however, they do not address
obfuscations explicitly. Waseem and Hovy (2016)
and Wulczyn et al. (2017) also use character n-
grams to attain impressive results on their respec-
tive datasets. That said, the current state of the
art methods do not exploit character-level infor-
mation, but instead utilize recurrent neural net-
work (RNN) models operating on word embed-
dings alone (Pavlopoulos et al., 2017; Badjatiya
et al., 2017). Since the problem of deliberately
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noisy input is not explicitly accounted for, these
approaches resort to the use of a generic OOV
(out of vocabulary) embedding for words not seen
in the training phase. However, in using a sin-
gle embedding for all unseen words, such ap-
proaches lose the ability to distinguish obfuscated
words from non-obfuscated or rare ones. Recently,
Mishra et al. (2018) and Qian et al. (2018),
working with the same Twitter dataset as we do,
reported that many of the misclassifications by
their RNN-based methods happen due to inten-
tional misspellings and/or rare words.
Our contributions are two-fold: first, we exper-
imentally demonstrate that character n-gram fea-
tures are complementary to the current state of the
art RNN approaches to abusive language detection
and can strengthen their performance. We then ex-
plicitly address the problem of deliberately noisy
input by constructing a model that operates at the
character level and learns to predict embeddings
for unseen words. We show that the integration of
this model with the character-enhanced RNN meth-
ods further advances the state of the art in abuse
detection on three datasets from two different do-
mains, namely Twitter and Wikipedia talk page.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
to use character-based word composition models
for abuse detection.
2 Related Work
Yin et al. (2009) were among the first ones to ap-
ply supervised learning to the task of abuse detec-
tion. They worked with a linear support vector ma-
chine trained on local (e.g., n-grams), contextual
(e.g., similarity of a post to its neighboring posts),
and sentiment-based (e.g., presence of expletives)
features to recognize posts involving harassment.
Djuric et al. (2015) worked with comments
taken from the Yahoo Finance portal and demon-
strated that distributional representations of com-
ments learned using the paragraph2vec frame-
work (Le and Mikolov, 2014) can outperform sim-
pler bag-of-words BOW features under supervised
classification settings for hate speech detection.
Nobata et al. (2016) improved upon the results of
Djuric et al. by training their classifier on an amal-
gamation of features derived from four different
categories: linguistic (e.g., count of insult words),
syntactic (e.g. part-of-speech POS tags), distribu-
tional semantic (e.g., word and comment embed-
dings) and n-gram based (e.g., word bi-grams).
They noted that while the best results were ob-
tained with all features combined, character n-
grams had the highest impact on performance.
Waseem and Hovy (2016) utilized a logistic
regression (LR) classifier to distinguish amongst
racist, sexist, and clean tweets in a dataset of ap-
proximately 16k of them. They found that char-
acter n-grams coupled with gender information of
users formed the optimal feature set for the task.
On the other hand, geographic and word-length
distribution features provided little to no improve-
ment. Experimenting with the same dataset, Bad-
jatiya et al. (2017) improved on their results by
training a gradient-boosted decision tree (GBDT)
classifier on averaged word embeddings learnt us-
ing a long short-term memory (LSTM) models ini-
tialized with random embeddings. Mishra et al.
(2018) went on to incorporate community-based
profiling features of users in their classification
methods, which led to the state of the art perfor-
mance on this dataset.
Waseem (2016) studied the influence of anno-
tators’ knowledge on the task of hate speech de-
tection. For this, they sampled 7k tweets from
the same corpus as Waseem and Hovy (2016) and
recruited expert and amateur annotators to anno-
tate the tweets as racism, sexism, both or neither.
Combining this dataset with that of Waseem and
Hovy (2016), Park et al. (2017) evaluated the ef-
ficacy of a 2-step classification process: they first
used an LR classifier to separate abusive and non-
abusive tweets, and then used another LR classifier
to distinguish between the racist and sexist ones.
They showed that this setup had comparable per-
formance to a 1-step classification approach based
on convolutional neural networks (CNNs) operat-
ing on word and character embeddings.
Wulczyn et al. (2017) created three different
datasets of comments collected from the English
Wikipedia Talk page: one was annotated for per-
sonal attacks, another for toxicity, and the third
for aggression. They achieved their best results
with a multi-layered perceptron classifier trained
on character n-gram features. Working with the
personal attack and toxicity datasets, Pavlopoulos
et al. (2017) outperformed the methods of Wul-
czyn et al. by having a gated recurrent unit (GRU)
to model the comments as dense low-dimensional
representations, followed by an LR layer to clas-
sify the comments based on those representations.
Davidson et al. (2017) produced a dataset of
about 25k racist, offensive or clean tweets. They
evaluated several multi-class classifiers with the
aim of discerning clean tweets from racist and of-
fensive tweets, while simultaneously being able to
distinguish between the racist and offensive ones.
Their best model was an LR classifier trained using
TF–IDF and POS n-gram features coupled with fea-
tures like count of hash tags and number of words.
3 Datasets
Following the proceedings of the 1st Workshop on
Abusive Language Online (Waseem et al., 2017),
we use three datasets from two different domains.
3.1 Twitter
Waseem and Hovy (2016) prepared a dataset of
16, 914 tweets from a corpus of approximately
136k tweets retrieved over a period of two months.
They bootstrapped their collection process with a
search for commonly used slurs and expletives re-
lated to religious, sexual, gender and ethnic mi-
norities. After having manually annotated 16, 914
of the tweets as racism, sexism or neither, they
asked an expert to review their annotations in order
to mitigate against any biases. The inter-annotator
agreement was reported at κ = 0.84, with further
insight that 85% of all the disagreements occurred
in the sexism class alone.
The authors released the dataset as a list of
16, 907 tweet IDs and their corresponding anno-
tations. We could only retrieve 16, 202 of the
tweets with python’s Tweepy library since some
of them have been deleted or their visibility has
been limited. Of the ones retrieved, 1,939 (12%)
are racism, 3,148 (19.4%) are sexism, and the re-
maining 11,115 (68.6%) are neither; the origi-
nal dataset has a similar distribution, i.e., 11.7%
racism, 20.0% sexism, and 68.3% neither.
3.2 Wikipedia talk page
Wulczyn et al. (2017) extracted approximately
63M talk page comments from a public dump
of the full history of English Wikipedia released
in January 2016. From this corpus, they ran-
domly sampled comments to form three datasets
on personal attack, toxicity and aggression, and
engaged workers from CrowdFlower to annotate
them. Noting that the datasets were highly skewed
towards the non-abusive classes, the authors over-
sampled comments from banned users to attain a
more uniform distribution.
In this work, we utilize the toxicity and per-
sonal attack datasets, henceforth referred to as W-
TOX and W-ATT respectively. Each comment in
both of these datasets was annotated by at least 10
workers. We use the majority annotation of each
comment to resolve its gold label: if a comment
is deemed toxic (alternatively, attacking) by more
than half of the annotators, we label it as abusive;
otherwise, as non-abusive. 13,590 (11.7%) of the
115,864 comments in W-ATT and 15,362 (9.6%)
of the 159,686 comments in W-TOX are abusive.
Wikipedia comments, with an average length of
25 tokens, are considerably longer than the tweets
which have an average length of 8.
4 Methods
We experiment with ten different methods, eight
of which have an RNN operating on word embed-
dings. Six of these eight also include character n-
gram features, and four further integrate our word
composition model. The remaining two comprise
an RNN that works directly on character inputs.
Hidden-state (HS). As our first baseline, we adopt
the “RNN” method of Pavlopoulos et al. (2017)
since it produces state of the art results on the
Wikipedia datasets. Given a text formed of a se-
quence w1, . . . , wn of words (represented by d-
dimensional word embeddings), the method uti-
lizes a 1-layer GRU to encode the words into hid-
den states h1, . . . , hn. This is followed by an LR
layer that classifies the text based on the last hid-
den state hn. We modify the authors’ original ar-
chitecture in two minor ways: we extend the 1-
layer GRU to a 2-layer GRU and use softmax as the
activation in the LR layer instead of sigmoid.1
Following Pavlopoulos et al., we initialize the
word embeddings to GLoVe vectors (Pennington
et al., 2014). In all our methods, words not present
in the GLoVe set are randomly initialized in the
range ±0.05, indicating the lack of semantic in-
formation. By not mapping these words to a single
random embedding, we mitigate against the errors
that may arise due to their conflation (Madhyastha
et al., 2015). A special OOV (out of vocabulary)
token is also initialized in the same range. All the
embeddings are updated during training, allowing
for some of the randomly-initialized ones to get
1We also experimented with 1-layer GRU/LSTM and 1/2-
layer bi-directional GRUs/LSTMs but the performance only
worsened or showed no gains; using sigmoid instead of soft-
max did not have any noteworthy effects on the results either.
task-tuned (Kim, 2014); the ones that do not get
tuned lie closely clustered around the OOV token
to which unseen words in the test set are mapped.
Word-sum (WS). The “LSTM+GLoVe+GBDT”
method of Badjatiya et al. (2017) constitutes
our second baseline. The authors first employ
an LSTM to task-tune GLoVe-initialized word em-
beddings by propagating error back from an LR
layer. They then train a gradient-boosted decision
tree (GBDT) classifier to classify texts based on
the average of the constituent word embeddings.2
We make two minor modifications to the original
method: we utilize a 2-layer GRU3 instead of the
LSTM to tune the embeddings, and we train the
GBDT classifier on the L2-normalized sum of the
embeddings instead of their average.4
Hidden-state + char n-grams (HS + CNG). Here
we extend the hidden-state baseline: we train
the 2-layer GRU architecture as before, but now
concatenate its last hidden state hn with L2-
normalized character n-gram counts to train a
GBDT classifier.
Augmented hidden-state + char n-grams
(AUGMENTED HS + CNG). In the above methods,
unseen words in the test set are simply mapped
to the OOV token since we do not have a way
of obtaining any semantic information about
them. However, this is undesirable since racial
slurs and expletives are often deliberately fudged
by users to prevent detection. In using a single
embedding for all unseen words, we lose the
ability to distinguish such obfuscations from other
non-obfuscated or rare words. Taking inspiration
from the effectiveness of character-level features
in abuse detection, we address this issue by having
a character-based word composition model that
can compose embeddings for unseen words in the
test set (Pinter et al., 2017). We then augment the
hidden-state + char n-grams method with it.
2In their work, the authors report that initializing embed-
dings randomly rather than with GLoVe yields state of the art
performance on the Twitter dataset that we are using. How-
ever, we found the opposite when performing 10-fold strat-
ified cross-validation (CV). A possible explanation of this
lies in the authors’ decision to not use stratification, which
for such a highly imbalanced dataset can lead to unexpected
outcomes (Forman and Scholz, 2010). Furthermore, the au-
thors train their LSTM on the entire dataset including the test
part without any early stopping criterion; this facilitates over-
fitting of the randomly-initialized embeddings.
3The deeper 2-layer GRU slightly improves performance.
4L2-normalized sum ensures uniformity of range across
the feature set in all our methods; GBDT, being a tree based
model, is not affected by the choice of monotonic function.
Specifically, our model (Figure 1b) comprises
a 2-layer bi-directional LSTM, followed by a hid-
den layer with tanh non-linearity and an output
layer at the end. The model takes as input a se-
quence c1, . . . , ck of characters, represented as
one-hot vectors, from a fixed vocabulary (i.e., low-
ercase English alphabet and digits) and outputs a
d-dimensional embedding for the word ‘c1 . . . ck’.
Bi-directionality of the LSTM allows for the se-
mantics of both the prefix and the suffix (last hid-
den forward and backward state) of the input word
to be captured, which are then combined to form
the hidden state for the input word. The model
is trained by minimizing the mean squared er-
ror (MSE) between the embeddings that it pro-
duces and the task-tuned embeddings of words in
the training set. This ensures that newly com-
posed embeddings are endowed with characteris-
tics from both the GLoVe space as well as the task-
tuning process. While approaches like that of Bo-
janowski et al. (2017) can also compose embed-
dings for unseen words, they cannot endow the
newly composed embeddings with characteristics
from the task-tuning process; this may constitute a
significant drawback (Kim, 2014).
During the training of our character-based word
composition model, to emphasize frequent words,
we feed a word as many times as it appears in the
training corpus. We note that a 1-layer CNN with
global max-pooling in place of the 2-layer LSTM
provides comparable performance while requiring
significantly less time to train. This is expected
since words are not very long sequences, and the
filters of the CNN are able to capture the different
character n-grams within them.
Context hidden-state + char n-grams
(CONTEXT HS + CNG). In the augmented
hidden-state + char n-grams method, the word
composition model infers semantics of unseen
words solely on the basis of the characters in them.
However, for many words, semantic inference
and sense disambiguation require context, i.e.,
knowledge of character sequences in the vicinity.
An example is the word cnt that has different
meanings in the sentences “I cnt undrstand this!”
and “You feminist cnt!”, i.e., cannot in the former
and the sexist slur cunt in the latter. Yet another
example is an obfuscation like ‘’You mot otherf uc
ker! where the expletive motherfucker cannot be
properly inferred from any fragment without the
knowledge of surrounding character sequences.
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Context-aware approach to word composition. The figure on the left shows how the encoder
extracts context-aware representations of characters in the phrase “cat sat on” from their one-hot repre-
sentations. The dotted lines denote the space character unionsq which demarcates word boundaries. Semantics
of an unseen word, e.g., sat, can then be inferred by our word composition model shown on the right.
To address this, we develop context-aware
representations for characters as inputs to our
character-based word composition model instead
of one-hot representations.5 We introduce an en-
coder architecture to produce the context-aware
representations. Specifically, given a text formed
of a sequence w1, . . . , wn of words, the encoder
takes as input one-hot representations of the char-
acters c1, . . . , ck within the concatenated sequence
‘w1unionsq . . . unionsqwn’, where unionsq denotes the space charac-
ter. This input is passed through a bi-directional
LSTM that produces hidden states h1, . . . , hk, one
for every character. Each hidden state, referred to
as context-aware character representation, is the
average of its designated forward and backward
states; hence, it captures both the preceding as
well as the following contexts of the character
it corresponds to. Figure 1 illustrates how the
context-aware representations are extracted and
used for inference by our character-based word
composition model. The model is trained in the
same manner as done in the augmented hidden-
state + char n-grams method, i.e., by minimiz-
ing the MSE between the embeddings that it pro-
duces and the task-tuned embeddings of words in
the training set (initialized with GLoVe). However,
5We also experimented with word-level context but did
not get any significant improvements. We believe this is due
to higher variance at word level than at the character level.
the inputs now are context-aware representations
of characters instead of one-hot representations.
Word-sum + char n-grams (WS + CNG),
Augmented word-sum + char n-grams
(AUGMENTED WS + CNG), and Context
word-sum + char n-grams (CONTEXT WS +
CNG). These methods are identical to the (context/
augmented) hidden-state + char n-grams methods
except that here we include the character n-grams
and our character-based word composition model
on top of the word-sum baseline.
Char hidden-state (CHAR HS) and Char word-
sum (CHAR WS). In all the methods described up
till now, the input to the core RNN is word em-
beddings. To gauge whether character-level inputs
are themselves sufficient or not, we construct two
methods based on the character to word (C2W) ap-
proach of Ling et al. (2015). For the char hidden-
state method, the input is one-hot representations
of characters from a fixed vocabulary. These rep-
resentations are encoded into a sequence w1, . . . ,
wn of intermediate word embeddings by a 2-layer
bi-directional LSTM. The word embeddings are
then fed into a 2-layer GRU that transforms them
into hidden states h1, . . . , hn. Finally, as in the
hidden-state baseline, an LR layer with softmax
activation uses the last hidden state hn to perform
classification while propagating error backwards
to train the network. The char word-sum method
is similar except that once the network has been
trained, we use the intermediate word embeddings
produced by it to train a GBDT classifier in the
same manner as done in the word-sum baseline.
5 Experiments and Results
5.1 Experimental setup
We normalize the input by lowercasing all words
and removing stop words. For the GRU architec-
ture, we use exactly the same hyper-parameters
as Pavlopoulos et al. (2017),6 i.e., 128 hidden
units, Glorot initialization, cross-entropy loss, and
Adam optimizer (Kingma and Ba, 2015). Bad-
jatiya et al. (2017) also use the same settings
except they have fewer hidden units. The LSTM
in our character-based word composition model
has 256 hidden units while that in our encoder
has 64; the CNN has filters of widths varying
from 1 to 4. The results we report are with an
LSTM-based word composition model. In all the
models, besides dropout regularization (Srivastava
et al., 2014), we hold out a small part of the train-
ing set as validation data to prevent over-fitting.
We use 300d embeddings and 1 to 5 character n-
grams for Wikipedia and 200d embeddings and
1 to 4 character n-grams for Twitter. We imple-
ment the models in Keras (Chollet et al., 2015)
with Theano back-end. We employ Lightgbm (Ke
et al., 2017) as our GDBT classifier and tune its
hyper-parameters using 5-fold grid search.
5.2 Twitter results
For the Twitter dataset, unlike previous research
(Badjatiya et al., 2017; Park and Fung, 2017), we
report the macro precision, recall, and F1 averaged
over 10 folds of stratified CV (Table 1). For a
classification problem with N classes, macro pre-
cision (similarly, macro recall and macro F1) is
given by:
Macro P =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Pi
where Pi denotes precision on class i. Macro met-
rics provide a better sense of effectiveness on the
minority classes (Van Asch, 2013).
We observe that character n-grams (CNG) con-
sistently enhance performance, while our aug-
mented approach (AUGMENTED) further improves
6The authors have not released their models; we replicate
their method based on the details in their paper.
upon the results obtained with character n-grams.
All the improvements are statistically significant
with p < 0.05 under 10-fold CV paired t-test.
As Ling et al. (2015) noted in their POS tagging
experiments, we observe that the CHAR HS and
CHAR WS methods perform worse than their coun-
terparts that use pre-trained word embeddings, i.e.,
the HS and WS baselines respectively.
To further analyze the performance of our
best methods (CONTEXT/AUGMENTED WS/HS +
CNG), we also examine the results on the racism
and sexism classes individually (Table 2). As be-
fore, we see that our approach consistently im-
proves over the baselines, and the improvements
are statistically significant under paired t-tests.
Method P R F1
HS 79.14 77.06 78.01
CHAR HS 79.48 69.00 72.36
HS + CNG† 80.36 78.20 79.19
AUGMENTED HS + CNG† 81.28 77.84 79.37
CONTEXT HS + CNG† 81.39 77.47 79.21
WS 80.78 72.83 75.93
CHAR WS 80.04 68.17 71.94
WS + CNG† 83.16 76.60 79.31
AUGMENTED WS + CNG† 83.50 77.20 79.80
CONTEXT WS + CNG† 83.44 77.06 79.67
Table 1: Results on the Twitter dataset. The meth-
ods we propose are denoted by †. Our best method
(AUGMENTED WS + CNG) significantly outper-
forms all other methods.
Method P R F1
HS 74.15 72.46 73.24
AUGMENTED HS + CNG† 76.28 72.72 74.40
CONTEXT HS + CNG† 76.61 72.15 74.26
WS 76.43 67.77 71.78
AUGMENTED WS + CNG† 78.17 72.20 75.01
CONTEXT WS + CNG† 77.90 72.26 74.91
(a) Racism
Method P R F1
HS 76.04 68.84 72.24
AUGMENTED HS + CNG† 80.07 69.28 74.26
CONTEXT HS + CNG† 80.29 68.52 73.92
WS 81.75 57.37 67.38
AUGMENTED WS + CNG† 85.61 65.91 74.44
CONTEXT WS + CNG† 85.80 65.41 74.18
(b) Sexism
Table 2: The baselines (WS, HS) vs. our best ap-
proaches (†) on the racism and sexism classes.
Additionally, we note that the AUGMENTED WS
+ CNG method improves the F1 score of the WS
+ CNG method from 74.12 to 75.01 for the racism
class, and from 74.03 to 74.44 for the sexism class.
The AUGMENTED HS + CNG method similarly im-
proves the F1 score of the HS + CNG method from
74.00 to 74.40 on the racism class while making
no notable difference on the sexism class.
We see that the CONTEXT HS/WS + CNG meth-
ods do not perform as well as the AUGMENTED
HS/WS + CNG methods. One reason for this
is that the Twitter dataset is not able to expose
the methods to enough contexts due to its small
size. Moreover, because the collection of this
dataset was bootstrapped with a search for certain
commonly-used abusive words, many such words
are shared across multiple tweets belonging to dif-
ferent classes. Given the above, context-aware
character representations perhaps do not provide
substantial distinctive information.
5.3 Wikipedia results
Following previous work (Pavlopoulos et al.,
2017; Wulczyn et al., 2017), we conduct a stan-
dard 60:40 train–test split experiment on the two
Wikipedia datasets. Specifically, from W-TOX,
95, 692 comments (10.0% abusive) are used for
training and 63, 994 (9.1% abusive) for testing;
from W-ATT, 70, 000 (11.8% abusive) are used for
training and 45, 854 (11.7% abusive) for testing.
Table 3 reports the macro F1 scores. We do not
report scores from the CHAR HS and CHAR WS
methods since they showed poor preliminary re-
sults compared to the HS and WS baselines.
Method W-TOX W-ATT
HS 88.65 86.28
HS + CNG† 89.29 87.32
AUGMENTED HS + CNG† 89.31 87.33
CONTEXT HS + CNG† 89.35 87.44
WS 85.49 84.35
WS + CNG† 87.12 85.80
AUGMENTED WS + CNG† 87.02 85.75
CONTEXT WS + CNG† 87.16 85.81
Table 3: Macro F1 scores on the two Wikipedia
datasets. The current state of the art method for
these datasets is HS. † denotes the methods we
propose. Our best method (CONTEXT HS + CNG)
outperforms all the other methods.
Mirroring the analysis carried out for the Twit-
ter dataset, Table 4 further compares the per-
formance of our best methods for Wikipedia
(CONTEXT/AUGMENTED HS + CNG) with that of
the state of the art baseline (HS) on specifically the
abusive classes of W-TOX and W-ATT.
Method P R F1
HS 84.48 74.60 79.24
AUGMENTED HS + CNG† 85.43 76.02 80.45
CONTEXT HS + CNG† 85.42 76.17 80.53
(a) W-TOX
Method P R F1
HS 78.61 72.88 75.64
AUGMENTED HS + CNG† 81.23 74.06 77.48
CONTEXT HS + CNG† 81.39 74.28 77.67
(b) W-ATT
Table 4: The current state of the art baseline (HS)
vs. our best methods (†) on the abusive classes of
W-TOX and W-ATT.
We observe that the augmented approach sub-
stantially improves over the state of the art base-
line. Unlike in the case of Twitter, our context-
aware setup for word composition is now able to
further enhance performance courtesy of the larger
size of the datasets which increases the availability
of contexts. All improvements are significant (p <
0.05) under paired t-tests. We note, however, that
the gains we get here with the word composition
model are relatively small compared to those we
get for Twitter. This difference can be explained
by the fact that: (i) Wikipedia comments are less
noisy than the tweets and contain fewer obfusca-
tions, and (ii) the Wikipedia datasets, being much
larger, expose the methods to more words dur-
ing training, hence reducing the likelihood of un-
seen words being important to the semantics of the
comments they belong to (Kim et al., 2016).
Like Pavlopoulos et al. (2017), we see that
the methods that involve summation of word em-
beddings (WS) perform significantly worse on the
Wikipedia datasets compared to those that use hid-
den state (HS); however, their performance is com-
parable or even superior on the Twitter dataset.
This contrast is best explained by the observation
of Nobata et al. (2016) that taking average or
sum of word embeddings compromises contextual
and word order information. While this is ben-
eficial in the case of tweets which are short and
loosely-structured, it leads to poor performance of
the WS and WS + CNG methods on the Wikipedia
datasets, with the addition of the word composi-
tion model (CONTEXT/AUGMENTED WS + CNG)
providing little to no improvements.
Abusive sample Predicted class
WS WS + CNG AUGMENTED WS + CNG
@mention I love how the Islamofascists recruit 14 and 15 year
old jihadis and then talk about minors in reference to 17 year
olds.
neither racism racism
@mention @mention @mention As a certified inmate of the Is-
lamasylum, you don’t have the ability to judge.
neither racism racism
@mention “I’ll be ready in 5 minutes” from a girl usually
means “I’ll be ready in 20+ minutes.” #notsexist #knownfrom-
experience
neither sexism sexism
RT @mention: #isis #muslim #Islamophobia? I think the word
you’re searching for is #Islamorealism http://t.co/NyihT8Bqyu
http://t.c...
neither neither racism
@mention @mention And looking at your page, I can see that
you are in the business of photoshopping images, Islamist cock-
sucker.
neither neither racism
I think Kat is on the wrong show. #mkr is for people who can
cook. #stupidbitch #hopeyouareeliminated
neither neither sexism
@mention because w0m3n are a5sh0les #feminismishate neither neither sexism
Table 5: Improved classification upon the addition of character n-grams (CNG) and our word composition
model (AUGMENTED). Names of users have been replaced with mention for anonymity.
6 Discussion
To investigate the extent to which obfuscated
words can be a problem, we extract a number
of statistics. Specifically, we notice that out of
the approximately 16k unique tokens present in
the Twitter dataset, there are about 5.2k tokens
that we cannot find in the English dictionary.7
Around 600 of these 5.2k tokens are present in
the racist tweets, 1.6k in the sexist tweets, and
the rest in tweets that are neither. Examples from
the racist tweets include fuckbag, ezidiz, islamo-
fascists, islamistheproblem, islamasylum and isis-
aremuslims, while those from the sexist tweets in-
clude c*nt, bbbbitch, feminismisawful, and stupid-
bitch. Given that the racist and sexist tweets come
from a small number of unique users, 5 and 527
respectively, we believe that the presence of ob-
fuscated words would be even more pronounced if
tweets were procured from more unique users.
In the case of the Wikipedia datasets, around
15k unique tokens in the abusive comments of
both W-TOX and W-ATT are not attested in the En-
glish dictionary. Examples of such tokens from
W-TOX include fuggin, n*gga, fuycker, and 1d10t;
and from W-ATT include f**king, beeeitch, musul-
mans, and motherfucken. In comparison to the
tweets, the Wikipedia comments use more “stan-
dard” language. This is validated by the fact that
only 14% of the tokens present in W-TOX and W-
ATT are absent from the English dictionary as op-
7We use the US English spell-checking utility provided by
the PyEnchant library of python.
posed to 32% of the tokens in the Twitter dataset
even though the Wikipedia ones are almost ten
times larger.
Across the three datasets, we note that the ad-
dition of character n-gram features enhances the
performance of RNN-based methods, corroborat-
ing the previous findings that they capture com-
plementary structural and lexical information of
words. The inclusion of our character-based word
composition model yields state of the art results
on all the datasets, demonstrating the benefits of
inferring the semantics of unseen words. Table
5 shows some abusive samples from Twitter that
are misclassified by the WS baseline method but
are correctly classified upon the addition of char-
acter n-grams (WS + CNG) and the further addition
of our character-based word composition model
(AUGMENTED WS + CNG).
Many of the abusive tweets that remain mis-
classified by the AUGMENTED WS + CNG method
are those that are part of some abusive dis-
course (e.g., @Mich McConnell Just “her body”
right?) or contain URLs to abusive content (e.g.,
@salmonfarmer1: Logic in the world of Islam
http://t.co/6nALv2HPc3).
In the case of the Wikipedia datasets, there are
abusive examples like smyou have a message re
your last change, go fuckyourself!!! and F-uc-k
you, a-ss-hole Motherf–ucker! that are misclassi-
fied by the state of the art HS baseline and the HS
+ CNG method but correctly classified by our best
method for the datasets, i.e., CONTEXT HS + CNG.
Word Similar words in training set
women girls, woman, females, chicks, ladies
w0m3n† woman, women, girls, ladies, chicks
cunt twat, prick, faggot, slut, asshole
a5sh0les† assholes, stupid, cunts, twats, faggots
stupidbitch† idiotic, stupid, dumb, ugly, women
jihad islam, muslims, sharia, terrorist, jihadi
jihaaadi† terrorists, islamist, jihadists, muslims
terroristislam† terrorists, muslims, attacks, extremists
fuckyouass† fuck, shit, fucking, damn, hell
Table 6: Words in the training set that exhibit high
cosine similarity to the given word. The ones
marked with † are not seen during training; em-
beddings for them are composed using our word
composition model.
To ascertain the effectiveness of our task-tuning
process for embeddings, we conducted a quali-
tative analysis, validating that semantically simi-
lar words cluster together in the embedding space.
Analogously, we assessed the merits of our word
composition model by verifying the neighbors of
embeddings formed by it for obfuscated words not
seen during training. Table 6 provides some exam-
ples. We see that our model correctly infers the se-
mantics of obfuscated words, even in cases where
obfuscation is by concatenation of words.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we considered the problem of obfus-
cated words in the field of automated abuse detec-
tion. Working with three datasets from two differ-
ent domains, namely Twitter and Wikipedia talk
page, we first comprehensively replicated the pre-
vious state of the art RNN methods for the datasets.
We then showed that character n-grams capture
complementary information, and hence, are able
to enhance the performance of the RNNs. Finally,
we constructed a character-based word composi-
tion model in order to infer semantics for unseen
words and further extended it with context-aware
character representations. The integration of our
composition model with the enhanced RNN meth-
ods yielded the best results on all three datasets.
We have experimentally demonstrated that our ap-
proach to modeling obfuscated words significantly
advances the state of the art in abuse detection. In
the future, we wish to explore its efficacy in tasks
such as grammatical error detection and correc-
tion. We will make our models and logs of experi-
ments publicly available at https://github.
com/pushkarmishra/AbuseDetection.
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